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Abstract
We show that computational problem of testing the behaviour of quantum circuits is hard for
the class of problems known as QMA that can be verified efficiently with a quantum computer. This
result is a generalization of the techniques previously used to prove the hardness of other problemon
quantum circuits. We use this result to show the QMA-hardness of a weak version of the problem of
detecting the insecurity of a symmetric-key quantum encryption system, or alternately the problem
of determining when a quantum channel is not private. We also give aQMAprotocol for the problem
of detecting insecure encryption to show that it isQMA-complete.
1 Introduction
Testing the behaviour of a computational system is a problem central to the study of quantum comput-
ing. This is the problem faced by an experimentalist who has implemented a quantum computation
and wants to check that the implementation behaves (approximately) correctly on all input states. An
efficient solution to this problem would allow for the verification that a circuit provided by an untrusted
party correctly implements some desired operation. Unfortunately we show in a general model that
even a weak version of this problem is likely to be computationally intractable and so any solution to
this problemwill need tomake essential use of the structure of the operation that the circuit is supposed
to implement. The problemwe consider is, given a quantum circuit, to decide between two cases: either
the circuit acts in the desired way on all input states, or the circuit misbehaves, acting in somemalicious
way on a large subspace of input states. This problem is QMA-hard even when both the desired and
malicious behaviour are known (i.e. specified by uniform families of quantum circuits).
The class QMA is the set of all problems that can be verified up to bounded error on a quantum
computer. Several problems are known to be complete for QMA: these problems can be thought of as
alternate characterizations of the class, as they capture exactly the power of this computational model.
The first of these complete problems is the problem of determining the ground state energy of a local
Hamiltonian. This was first shown to be complete on k -local Hamiltonians [15] for k ≥ 5, before the
problem was shown to remain hard in the 2-local case [14]. The problem of determining if local descrip-
tions of a quantum system are consistent is also known to be QMA-complete [16], though only under
Turing reductions. Other problems related to finding ground states of physical systems are also known
to be complete forQMA [20, 21].
There are also problems on quantum circuits that are known to beQMA-complete. The first of these
is the Non-identity check problem [13], which given as input a unitary quantum circuit, the problem is
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to decide if there is an input on which the circuit acts non-trivially or if the circuit is close to the identity
for all input states. The problem of determining if a circuit is close to an isometry (i.e. a reversible
transformation that maps pure states to pure states) is also known to beQMA-complete [18].
In this paper we generalize the hardness proofs of [13, 18] to show that the QMA-hardness of the
problem of testing the properties of the outputs of quantum circuits. More specifically, we define the
circuit testing problem, which has as parameters two uniformly generated families of quantum circuits
C1 and C2. The problem is do decide, given an input circuit C , whether C acts like circuits from the
family C1 on a large input subspace, or whether C acts like circuits from C2 for all input states. Using
this result we reprove the QMA-hardness of non-identity check and non-isometry testing by making
choices for the families C1 and C2. We also show that some other circuit problems are hard, such asa
version of finding the minimum output entropy (this is similar in spirit to the results in [5], though our
model is incompatible), or determining when a channel has an pure (approximate) fixed point.
It is important to note that, despite the name, this problem is not related to property testing. In this
problemwe have a significantly weaker promise—in one case the circuit only behaves in a certainway on
a subspace of the input. For an input space of dimension d , this subspace can be as large as d 1−δ for an
arbitrary constant δ> 0 but this subspace is still far from the whole input space. Essentially the problem
is to detect if the circuit behaves in a certain way only when a specific input state is provided on some
subset of the input qubits. Note also that while we can use this problem to show the QMA-hardness of
several circuit problems, this technique does not show that these problems are in QMA.
We then apply this hardness result to the problem of detecting insecure quantum encryption. This
is the problem of deciding, given a quantum circuit that takes as input a quantum state as well as a clas-
sical key, whether this circuit is ǫ-close to a perfectly secure encryption scheme (i.e. a private quantum
channel [2, 6]), or whether there is a large subspace of input states that the circuit does not encrypt at all
(up to error ǫ). To show that this problem is hard, we argue that this problem contains as a special case
an instance of the circuit testing problem. Finally, we give a QMA verifier for this problem to prove that
it is QMA-complete.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains some mathematical back-
ground, a definition of the class QMA, and a discussion of private quantum channels. The hardness of
the circuit testing problem is shown in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 contains the proof that the problem
of detecting insecure encryption is QMA-complete.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Background
Throughout the paper we let H ,K ,X ,Y , . . . represent (finite-dimensional) Hilbert spaces. The pure
quantum states are simply the unit vectors in these spaces. The set of density matrices on a space H
is denoted D(H ): these are the positive semidefinite operators with unit trace. We will use the notation
T(H ,K ) to represent the set of channels that map states in D(H ) to states in D(K ). More formally,
these transformations are exactly the completely positive trace preserving linear maps from L(H ) to
L(K ), where we use L(H ) to denote the set of all linear operators onH .
To measure the distance between quantum states we will make extensive use of the trace norm,
which for a linear operator X can be defined as ‖X ‖tr = tr
p
X ∗X . A useful alternate characterization
is that ‖X ‖tr is the sum of the singular values of X , or, in the case of a normal operator, the sum of the
absolute values of the eigenvalues. One important property of the trace distance
ρ−σ
tr
between two
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states is that it is monotone nonincreasing under the application of quantum channels.
We will also need the intuitive property that two states that are close together in the trace norm
produce similar measurement outcomes. This can be derived from the fact that an expression involving
the trace norm gives the maximum probability that two states can be distinguished [12],
Lemma 1. Let X ∈ L(H ) satisfy 0≤X ≤ 1 . Then
tr(Xρ)≤ tr(Xσ)+
ρ−σ
tr
In addition to the trace norm, we will also need a distance measure on the quantum channels.
Such a measure is given by the diamond norm, which for a linear map Φ : L(H ) → L(K ) is given by
‖Φ‖⋄ = supX∈L(H⊗H ) ‖(Φ⊗ 1H )(X )‖tr /‖X ‖tr. See [15] for an alternate definition and some further prop-
erties of this norm. In the case that Φ is the difference of two completely positive maps, we may re-
place the supremum in the definition of the diamond norm with a maximization over pure states in the
spaceH ⊗H [19]. Similarly to the trace norm, the diamond norm can be used to characterize the dis-
tinguishability of two quantum channels: here the fact that the definition involves a reference system
captures the fact that the optimal strategy to distinguish two channels may involve the use of entangled
input states.
Since we consider computational problems on quantum channels, we must specify how they are to
be given as input. For this we use the mixed-state circuit model, first defined in [1], where circuits are
composed of some (universal) collection of the usual unitary gates, plus a gate that introduces ancillary
qubits in the |0〉 state and a gate that traces out (i.e. discards) qubits. For simplicity we will assume that
all Hilbert spaces we encounter are composed of qubits, i.e. that the dimension is always a power of two,
though this is not strictly needed.
We use this circuit model because it can (approximately) represent any quantum channel, and in
the case of efficient quantum circuits this representation is of size polynomial in the number of input
qubits. Using circuits does not (significantly) restrict the applicability of our hardness results: they also
apply in any model that can efficiently simulate the circuit model, such as the model of measurement
based quantum computation.
2.2 QMA
In order to prove results about the class QMA, we give a formal definition. A language L is in QMA if
there is a quantum polynomial-time verifier V such that
1. if x ∈ L, then there exists a witness ρ such that Pr[V accepts ρ]≥ 1− ǫ,
2. if x 6∈ L, then for any state ρ, Pr[V accepts ρ]≤ ǫ,
The exact value of the error parameter ǫ is not significant: any ǫ < 1/2 that is at least an inverse polyno-
mial in the input size suffices [15, 17].
Let L be an arbitrary language in QMA, and let x be an arbitrary input string. Our goal will be to
encode theQMA-hard problem of deciding if x ∈ L into the problem of detecting an insecure encryption
circuit. To do this it will be convenient to represent the verifier as a unitary circuit V , which represents
the algorithm of the verifier in aQMA protocol on some input x . Wemay “hard-code” the input string x
into the circuit for V , since the circuit V needs only to be efficiently generated given x .
The algorithm implemented by the verifier in an arbitrary QMA protocol is given in Figure 1. The
verifier receives a witness state |ψ〉, applies the unitary V on the witness state and any ancillary qubits
3
|ψ〉 ✔✗
V
✓
✓✼
❄
|0〉
Figure 1: Verifier’s circuit in a QMA protocol. The verifier accepts the witness state |ψ〉 if and only if the
measurement in the computational basis results in the |1〉 state.
|+〉⊗6
t t t t t t
X
X
X
Z
Z
Z
❄
Figure 2: Example implementation of the completely depolarizing channel Ω on three qubits. In order
to obtain a private channel the state the qubits in the |+〉 state are replaced by a classical key k to obtain
the channel Ωk .
needed, and finally measures the first output qubit to decide whether or not to accept. Any qubits not
measured are traced out. One of the main results of this paper is a reduction from an arbitrary QMA
verifier to the problem of testing the behaviour of quantum circuits.
2.3 Private Quantum Channels
Quantum channels that are secure against eavesdroppers are those channels for which the input state
cannot be determined by the output. These channels can also be viewed as encryption systems: the key
is simply the environment space of the channel, which, when combined with the output state, allows
the input to be recovered. We restrict attention to private channels of a special form: those which allow
the input to be recovered not with the quantum state of the environment but instead with a classical
key that can be pre-shared between two parties that wish to establish a secure quantum channel. These
channels, called, private channels, were introduced and studied in [2, 6].
An important example of a private quantum channel is the completely depolarizing channel. This
is the channel Ω that maps any input to the completely mixed state. One circuit implementation of this
channel is given in Figure 2.
In order to use the completely depolarizing channel as a private channel wemust add a key. This can
be done to the implementation in Figure 2 by replacing the qubits in the |+〉 state with a classical string.
The result is a channel that applies a key-specified Pauli to each of the input qubits. We will refer to this
channel as Ωk when a specific key is used. Notice that if Ωk ∈ T(H ), then |k | = 2logdimH , i.e. we use
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two key bits for each encrypted qubit. In the case of a perfect encryption channel this rate of two key bits
per qubit is optimal [2, 6, 7]. When the key k is unknown and uniformly distributed, the channel Ωk is
identical to Ω, i.e. if the key k is uniformly distributed in {0, . . . ,2m − 1}we have
1
2m
∑
k
Ωk =Ω. (1)
We use the following definition of an approximately private channel (i.e. secure encryption).
Definition 2. Let E be a channel that takes two inputs: an integer k ∈ {1, . . . ,K } and a quantum state in
H and produces an output inK , where dimH ≤ dimK . For a fixed value of k we write Ek (·) = E (k , ·).
We call E a ǫ-private channel if
1. There is a decryption channel, i.e. there exists a channel D : {1, . . . ,K } ⊗D(K )→ D(H ) such that
for all k
‖Dk ◦Ek − 1H ‖⋄ ≤ ǫ,
where the size of the circuit forD is bounded by a polynomial in the size of the circuit for E .
2. Without the key k , the output of E has almost no information about the input state, i.e.
1
K
∑
k
Ek −Ω

⋄
≤ ǫ
where Ω ∈ T(H ,K ) is the depolarizing channel that maps all inputs to 1K /dimK .
The use of the diamond norm in this definition is significant: we require that both conditions hold
even for part of an entangled state. Specifically, a channel satisfying this definition both preserves any
entanglement with the transmitted state is and remains secure even in the case that an eavesdropper
is entangled with the input. We use this strong definition because one of the main results of the paper
is a hardness result: distinguishing secure and insecure encryption remains hard even when the secure
encryption is promised to be secure in this strongmodel. Our hardness result remains true for theweaker
model of private channels using only the trace norm.
This definition is a strengthened version of the model used by Ambainis and Smith [3], who define
security in a similar way, but only against adversaries that are not entangledwith the input state. Another
similar model is considered by Hayden et al. [11], which also does not consider entangled adversaries,
but uses a stronger bound involving the operator norm. The hardness result in this paper does not apply
with respect to this stronger bound.
Like the perfect encryption schemes found in [2, 6], the encryption scheme constructed by our re-
duction uses 2logd key bits to encrypt a state of dimension d . As argued (implicitly) in [4, 11] this is
essentially optimal: any scheme using fewer than 2logd (1− poly(ǫ)) key bits cannot be secure against
entangled adversaries.
3 Testing Circuits
The problem of testing the behaviour of a quantum circuit can be informally stated as: given a circuit
C , decide between two cases, either the circuit acts like some known circuit C0 on a large subspace of
the input, or the circuit acts like some other known circuit C1 on the whole input space. We use uniform
circuit families C0 and C1 since it is important that the circuit C , which is provided as input, takes the
same number of input and output qubits as the circuits C0 and C1.
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Problem 3 (CIRCUIT TESTING). Let 0 < ǫ < 1, 0 < δ ≤ 1, and C0,C1 be two uniform families of quantum
circuits. The input to the problem is a circuit C ∈ T(X ,Y ). Let C0,C1 be the circuits drawn from C0 and
C1 that take as input states onX . The promise problem is to decide between:
Yes: There exists a subspace S of X with dimS ≥ (dimX )1−δ such that for any reference space R and
any ρ ∈D(S⊗R) (C ⊗ 1R )(ρ)− (C0⊗ 1R )(ρ)tr ≤ ǫ,
No: ‖C −C1‖⋄ ≤ ǫ, i.e. for any reference spaceR and any ρ ∈H ⊗R(C ⊗ 1R )(ρ)− (C1⊗ 1R )(ρ)tr ≤ ǫ.
When the values of ǫ,δ,C0, andC1 are significant we will refer to this problem as CT(ǫ,δ,C0,C1).
This problem is well-defined only for families C0 and C1 that do not violate the promise, i.e. any
circuits whose output is not too close together. These are the circuits C0 and C1 such that there does not
exist a subspace T of H of size dimT > dimH δ such that for any input states ρ ∈ D(T ⊗R) we have(C0⊗ 1 R )(ρ)− (C1⊗ 1 R )(ρ)tr ≤ 2ǫ, i.e. there does not exist a large subspace of pure states on which
C0 and C1 produce output that is close together. This condition can be difficult to verify, but in many
applications it is easy to see that the two circuits do not agree on too many pure states. The application
of this hardness result to detecting insecure encryption, for instance, uses C0 as the identity and C1 as
the completely depolarizing channel, and these two circuits never agree on a pure input state. We are
able to prove that this problem is QMA-hard for any circuit families that satisfy this condition.
Notice also the special case δ= 1: here the CT problem asks if there are any input states on which the
circuitC behaves likeC0 or if it behaves likeC1 for all input states. In this case the problem is well-defined
for any familiesC0 andC1 that do not agree on the whole space (up to error 2ǫ).
Concerning theparameters ǫ andδ, wemay take ǫ = 2−p for anypolynomial p using an amplification
result forQMA [15, 17], and we may take δ to be any constant satisfying 0<δ≤ 1.
3.1 Testing Circuits is QMA-hard
To show the hardness of CT we use a reduction from an arbitrary problem in QMA. This involves em-
bedding the verifier in aQMA protocol into an instance of CT with the property that the resulting circuit
runsC0 if the Verifier can be made to accept and runsC1 if the Verifier cannot be made to accept.
Formalizing this notion, let L be an arbitrary language in QMA and let x be an input string. The
QMA-complete problem is to decide whether or not x ∈ L. Since L ∈ QMA, there exists some unitary
circuit V :H ⊗A →K which can be constructed efficiently from x such that if x ∈ L, there exists a pure
state |ψ〉 ∈H such thatmeasuring the first qubit of V (|ψ〉⊗|0〉) results in |1〉with probability at least 1−ǫ,
whereas if if x 6∈ L, then for any state |ψ〉 a measurement of V (|ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉) results in |1〉 with probability at
most ǫ. By using standard error-reduction techniques for QMA, we may take ǫ to be negligible in the
size of the circuit for V [15, 17]. Notice also that the restriction to pure witness states |ψ〉 can be made
without loss of generality using a convexity argument.
Our goal is to show that CT is hard for as many choices of parameters as possible. To this end, let
δ> 0 be constant and letC0 andC1 be uniform circuit families on which the problem CT(3
p
ǫ,δ,C0,C1)
is well-defined. These are any families Ci = {Ci ,n : n ≥ 1}, where the circuit Ci ,n takes an n qubit input
state, such that for any n the circuitsC0,n andC1,n do not produce outputs that are not too close together
on some large subspace of pure input states. In particular, we require that for all n , there does not exist a
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|0〉 t t
t
❞
V V ∗
❄
U0 U1
X
|0〉
ρ
¨
Figure 3: Circuit output by the reduction. The circuit V is the unitary circuit applied by theQMA verifier
for the language L. The circuit Ui is the unitary circuit obtained from Ci by removing the gates that
introduce ancillary qubits and trace out qubits.
subspace T of the n-qubit input spaceX with dimT > dimX δ such that for any states ρ ∈D(T ⊗R)we
have
(C0⊗ 1 R )(ρ)− (C1⊗ 1 R )(ρ)tr ≤ 6pǫ.
The key idea to the reduction is that we construct a circuit that takes an input state and applies the
unitary V to a portion of it, makes a ‘copy’ of the output bit with a controlled-not gate, and then applies
V ∗. If the result of theQMA protocol would have been the verifier accepting (i.e. the copy of the output
qubit is measured in the |1〉 state), then we apply the circuit C0. On the other hand, if the output qubit
was in the |0〉 state, we apply the circuitC1. This results in a circuit that appliesC0 if and only the input is a
state the Verifier in theQMA proof system accepts. In order to guarantee that the subspace of accepting
states in large enough, we add dummy input qubits that are ignored by the circuit V but are acted on
by either C0 or C1. By adding enough of these qubits, we can ensure that if there is at least one state V
accepts, then the result is a large subspace of states that are accepted.
The full construction of the circuit produced by the reduction is shown in Figure 3. Before describing
the circuit, we fix the notation that we will use. Let C0 and C1 be circuits drawn from C0 and C1 imple-
menting transformations in T(X ,Y ), whereX =F ⊗H and Y =F ⊗K , using the spacesH ,K from
the QMA Verifier for L. Further, we may let dimF =
 
dimH (1−δ)/δ
£
, since we are free to take any poly-
nomial number of input qubits toC0 andC1. We also assumewithout loss of generality that these circuits
are implemented by circuits that apply unitary circuits mapping X ⊗A → Y ⊗G , where the spaceA
holds any ancillary qubits needed by the circuit (initially in the |0〉 state) and the space G represents the
qubits traced out at the end of the computation. Any mixed-state circuit can be efficiently transformed
into a circuit of this form by moving the introduction of ancillary qubits to the start of the circuit and
delaying any partial traces to the end of the circuit. We may also assume that both the circuit V and
the circuits C0 and C1 use ancillary spacesA ,G of the same size, by simply padding the circuits using a
smaller space with unused ancillary qubits.
Let C be the circuit in Figure 3. This circuit takes as input a quantum state ρ on the space X =
F ⊗H . This circuit first applies V to the portion of ρ in H as well as any needed ancillary qubits in
the spaceA . Next, the circuit makes a classical copy of the ‘output bit’ of V , which is used as a control
for the application of the circuits C0 and C1. The circuit V ∗ is then applied, so that the result (provided
that V accepts or rejects with high probability) is a state that is close to the input state plus a qubit that
indicates whether V accepts or rejects the input state. The circuit then appliesC0 if V accepts andC1 if V
rejects. These circuits use the same ancillary spaceA as the circuits V and V ∗, but as long as the Verifier
V either accepts of rejects the input state with high probability, these ancillary qubits will be returned to
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the |0〉 state, up to trace distance 2pǫ.
Before proving the correctness of the reduction, it will be convenient to write down some of the
states produced by running the constructed circuit C . Let ρ be an arbitrary input state inD(H ⊗F ) and
let |ψ〉 ∈ H ⊗F ⊗R be a purification of ρ. The order of the spaces H and F has been changed for
notational convenience. After applying the unitary V to the portion of |ψ〉 inH , the state can be written
as
|φ〉= (V ⊗ 1F ⊗ 1 R )(|ψ〉⊗ |0〉),
where the |0〉 qubits are in the space A . Then, there exist states |φ0〉, |φ1〉 on all but the first qubit of
K ⊗F ⊗R such that
|φ〉=
p
1−p |0〉⊗ |φ0〉+
p
p |1〉⊗ |φ1〉
where 0≤ p ≤ 1 is exactly the probability that the Verifier accepts in the original protocol on input trF ρ.
Applying the controlled-not gate results in
|φ′〉=
p
1−p |00〉⊗ |φ0〉+
p
p |11〉⊗ |φ1〉.
We then bound the trace distance of |φ′〉 to |0〉|ψ〉 and |1〉|ψ〉. In the case of |0〉|ψ〉we have
|φ′〉〈φ′| − |0〉〈0| ⊗ |φ〉〈φ|
tr
= 2
q
1−
〈φ′|0φ〉2 = 2p1− (1−p )2 < 3pp , (2)
and in the similar case of |1〉|ψ〉 we have
|φ′〉〈φ′| − |1〉〈1| ⊗ |φ〉〈φ|
tr
= 2
q
1−
〈φ′|1φ〉2 = 2p1−p2 < 3p1−p . (3)
These two equations show that, when p is close to 0 or 1, the fact that we make a classical copy of the
output qubit does not have a large effect on the state of the system. (This fact can also be argued from
the Gentle Measurement Lemma [22].) The remainder of the circuit then applies V ∗ and, depending on
the value of the control qubit, one ofC0 andC1. We consider two cases, which are argued in two separate
propositions.
Proposition 4. If x ∈ L, then there exists a subspace S of X with dimS ≥ dimX 1−δ such that for any
reference systemR and any ρ ∈S⊗R
(C ⊗ 1 R )(|ψ〉〈ψ|)− (C0⊗ 1 R )(|ψ〉〈ψ|tr ≤ 3pǫ. (4)
Proof. If x ∈ L, then there is some input state |ψ〉 on which the Verifier accepts with probability p ≥
1− ǫ. Applying the remainder of the circuit, up to the partial trace, to the state |1〉|φ〉 results in the state
|1〉⊗ (U1⊗1 R )(|ψ〉⊗|0〉). Tracing out the spaceG as well as the copy of the output qubit, results in exactly
the state trG (U1⊗1 R )(|ψ〉〈ψ|⊗ |0〉〈0|)(U ∗1 ⊗1 R ) = (C1⊗1 R )(|ψ〉〈ψ|). This is not quite equal to the output
of the constructed circuit C , however, as in this evaluation we have replaced the state |φ′〉 with the state
|1〉|φ〉. However, using the monotonicity of the trace norm under quantum operations, the remainder of
the circuit cannot increase the norm of the two states, and so applying Equation (3), we have
(C ⊗ 1R )(|ψ〉〈ψ|)− (C0⊗ 1 R )(|ψ〉〈ψ|tr ≤ 3p1−p ≤ 3pǫ. (5)
It remains to show that this occurs on a large subspace ofX =H ⊗F . Since we have assumed the
Verifier V accepts with high probability on the state |ψ〉, this implies that there is some state |γ〉 ∈H for
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which V also accepts with probability at least 1− ǫ, as V ignores the qubits in F . Then, since |ψ〉 was
arbitrary, Equation (5) also applies to |γ〉 ⊗ |ξ〉 ∈ H ⊗F for any state |ξ〉 ∈ F . The subspace S of states
whose reduced state onH is equal to |γ〉 has dimension dimF . Then, since dimF =
 
dimH (1−δ)/δ
£
,
we have
dimX = dimH ⊗F = dimH dimF ≤ dimF δ/(1−δ)dimF = dimF 1/(1−δ),
which implies that dimF ≥ dimX 1−δ, as required. Thus, when x ∈ L the Verifier V can be made to
accept, and so the result is a yes instance of CT.
The remaining case is when x 6∈ L, i.e. the Verifier V rejects every state with high probability. This
proof of this case is extremely similar to the previous one.
Proposition 5. If x 6∈ L, then for any reference systemR and any ρ ∈X ⊗R , ‖C −C1‖⋄ ≤ 3
p
ǫ.
Proof. This proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4. If x 6∈ L, then V accepts any state |ψ〉 with
probability p ≤ ǫ. If we consider applying V ∗ and the remainder of the circuit to the state |0〉|φ〉, the
result is (C1 ⊗ 1 R )(|ψ〉〈ψ|), similarly to the previous case. Once again, we do not run this part of the
circuit on this state, but the state |φ′〉which is very close to it. Once again we can apply themonotonicity
of the trace norm under quantum operations and Equation (2) to show that
(C ⊗ 1 R )(|ψ〉〈ψ|)− (C1⊗ 1R )(|ψ〉〈ψ|tr ≤ 3pp ≤ 3pǫ.
Since this equation applies for all reference systems R and all states |ψ〉, this proves that if x 6∈ L, then
we have ‖C −C1‖⋄ ≤ 3
p
ǫ.
Taken together, these two proposition prove the hardness of the CT problem. Note once again that
in order for the CT problem to be well defined (i.e. the set of ‘yes’ instances does not intersect the set
of ‘no’ instances) we require that circuits from the two families are not too close together for any large
subspaces of pure input states. See the discussion following Problem 3 for a technical condition that is
equivalent to this requirement.
Theorem 6. CT(ǫ,δ,C0,C1) is QMA-hard for any 0< ǫ < 1 such that ǫ ≥ 2−p for some polynomial p, any
constant 0<δ≤ 1, and any uniform circuit familiesC0,C1 for which the problem is well-defined.
Proof. The correctness of the reduction is argued in In Propositions 4 and 5. It remains only to verify
that the reduction can be performed efficiently. To see that the reduction can be performed in time
polynomial in the size of the input x (which is at most polynomially smaller than the size of the circuit
V : the only part of the reduction that can cause a problem the size of the spaceF , since we have taken
dimF =
 
dimH (1−δ)/δ
£
. This implies that the space F requires a factor of (1−δ)/δ more qubits than
the space H , which is linear in the input dimension so long as δ is a constant. This implies that the
reduction can be performed in (classical deterministic) polynomial time.
3.2 Applications
In this section we apply Theorem 6 to reprove the hardness of some of the circuit problems that are
known to be hard for QMA as well as to show theQMA-hardness of some new circuit problems.
The first problem we consider is a slightly generalized version of the problem NON-IDENTITY CHECK
studied by Janzing, Wocjan, and Beth [13], who show that it is QMA-complete. Our version of the prob-
lem differs in that we allow the input circuit to be a mixed-state circuit. We do still require, however, that
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if the circuit does not act like the identity everywhere, then it acts like some efficient unitary circuitU on
some input state for whichU is far from the identity. This requirement is not needed to prove that this
problem is hard, but it is hard to see how to put the problem intoQMAwithout it.
Problem 7 (MIXED NON-IDENTITY CHECK [13]). Let 0 < ǫ < 1. On input C , a circuit in ∈ T(X ,X ), the
promise problem is to decide between:
Yes: ‖C − 1 ‖⋄ ≥ 2− ǫ and there exists an efficient unitaryU such that on some pure state |ψ〉 ∈ X we
have
C (|ψ〉〈ψ|)−U |ψ〉〈ψ|U ∗
tr
≤ ǫ and
U |ψ〉〈ψ|U ∗− |ψ〉〈ψ|
tr
≥ 2− ǫ.
No: ‖C − 1 ‖⋄ ≤ ǫ.
The QMA-hardness of this problem follows from Theorem 6 and the fact that CT(ǫ,1,U ,1 ) is a special
case of the problem, whereU is any uniform family of quantum circuits that are not close to the identity
(one such example is the family of circuits that apply Pauli X to the first input qubit).
The next problem we consider is the problem of detecting whether a (mixed-state) circuit is close to
an isometry, which was shown to be QMA-complete in [18]. This can be formalized as the problem of
detecting if there is a pure input state one which the output state is highly mixed.
Problem 8 (NON-ISOMETRY [18]). Let 0< ǫ < 1/2. On input a circuit C ∈ T(X ,Y ) the promise problem is
to decide between:
Yes: There exists |ψ〉 ∈X such that
(Φ⊗ 1X )(|ψ〉〈ψ|)∞ ≤ ǫ,
No: For all |ψ〉 ∈X ,
(Φ⊗ 1X )(|ψ〉〈ψ|)∞ ≥ 1− ǫ.
TheQMA-hardness of this problem follows from Theorem 6, since CT(ǫ,1,Ω,1 ) is a special case.
We can also apply Theorem 6 to show the hardness of the problem of determining if a channel has a
pure fixed point. This problem can be stated as follows.
Problem 9 (PURE FIXED POINT). Let 0< ǫ < 1. On input a circuit C ∈ T(X ,X ) the promise problem is to
decide between:
Yes: There exists |ψ〉 ∈X such that
C (|ψ〉〈ψ|)− |ψ〉〈ψ|
tr
≤ ǫ
No: For any |ψ〉 ∈X ,
C (|ψ〉〈ψ|)− |ψ〉〈ψ|
tr
≥ 2− ǫ
TheQMA-hardness of this problem follows from the fact that CT(ǫ,1,1 ,Ω) is a special case.
A related problem is determining if the minimum output entropy of a quantum channel is small.
Related results can be found in [5], though the model used there seems to be incompatible with the
model used in the present paper. In order to define this problem, let Smin(C ) = minρS(C (ρ)) be the
minimum output entropy of the channelC (where S is the von Neumann entropy).
Problem 10 (MINIMUM OUTPUT ENTROPY). Let 0 < ǫ < 1/2. On input a circuit C ∈ T(X ,X ) the promise
problem is to decide between:
Yes: Smin(C )≤ ǫ logdimX
No: Smin(C )≥ (1− ǫ) logdimX
As in the previous case, the QMA-hardness of this problem follows from Theorem 6 and the fact that
CT(ǫ/2,1,1 ,Ω) is a special case. The logdimX terms in the statement of the problem are due to the use
of Fannes Inequality [10] to transform trace distance bounds to entropy bounds.
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4 Detecting Insecure Encryption
In this section we consider the problem of detecting when a two-party symmetric key quantum encryp-
tion system is insecure. We first use Theorem 6 to show that this problem is hard, and then give a QMA-
verifier to show that it isQMA-complete. The problem can be defined as follows.
Problem 11 (DETECTING INSECURE ENCRYPTION). For 0< ǫ < 1 and 0< δ ≤ 1 an instance of the problem
consists of a quantum circuit E that takes as input a quantum state as well as am classical bits, such that
for each k ∈ {0,1}m the circuit implements a quantum channel Ek ∈ T(H ,K )with dimK ≥ dimH . The
promise problem is to decide between:
Yes: There exists a subspace S of H with dimS ≥ dimH 1−δ such that for any reference space R , any
ρ ∈D(S⊗R), and any key k ,
(Ek ⊗ 1 R )(ρ)−ρtr ≤ ǫ.
No: E is an ǫ-private channel, i.e.
Ω− 1
2m
∑
k∈{0,1}m Ek

⋄ ≤ ǫ, where Ω is the completely depolarizing
channel in T(H ,K ), and there exists an polynomial-size quantum circuit D such that for all k we
have ‖Dk ◦Ek − 1H ‖⋄ ≤ ǫ.
When the values of ǫ and δ are significant, we will refer to this problem as DIǫ,δ.
Informally, this is the problem of distinguishing two cases: either the channel fails to encrypt a large
subspace of the input qubits (for any key), or the channel is very close to a perfect encryption channel.
Theorem 12. DIǫ,δ is QMA-hard for all 0<ǫ < 1/2 and all 0<δ≤ 1.
Proof. Let Ek = {Ωk ,n} where Ωk ,n is the n-qubit channel that applies the k th Pauli operator to the input
qubits. As in Equation (1) averaging over all over all keys k results in the completely depolarizing channel
on n qubits. Then, Theorem 6 implies that CT(ǫ,δ,1 k ,Ek ) is hard forQMA, where 1 k is the channel that
discards the key k and does nothing to the quantum input.
The problem CT(ǫ,δ,1 k ,Ek ) involves a slight redefinition of the problem CT to include both a quan-
tum input, as well as a classical input k . This can be done without difficulty by including the classical
input as part of the quantum input (to circuits in the families 1 k and Ek ) that is immediately measured
in the computational basis (and in the case of 1 k , discarded). The problem CT(ǫ,δ,1 k ,Ek ) remains hard
after this modification.
The QMA-hardness of DIǫ,δ then follows immediately from the fact that the problem of detecting
insecure encryption is simply CT(ǫ,δ,1 k ,Ek ) with a weakened promise. Since the sets of ‘yes’ instances
of the two problems are identical, we need only verify the ‘no’ instances. Let the circuitC ∈ T(H ,K ) be a
‘no’ instance of CT(ǫ,δ,1 k ,Ek ) and let Ck (·) =C (|k 〉〈k |⊗ ·) be the circuit defined by hardcoding the input
in the ‘key’ portion of the input space. Then, for any input ρ and any key k , we have ‖Ck −Ωk ‖⋄ ≤ ǫ,
since this follows for the versions of these circuits without a hardcoded key (which is just a restriction of
the input space). From this equation, the triangle inequality implies thatΩ−
1
2m
∑
k
Ck

⋄
≤ 1
2m
∑
k
‖Ωk −Ck ‖⋄ ≤ ǫ,
which is the property required by ‘no’ instances of DI. To see further that the output of Ck can be de-
crypted with knowledge of k , observe that Ω−1
k
◦Ωk = 1 , and so it follows thatΩ−1
k
◦Ck − 1

⋄ ≤
Ω−1
k
◦Ck −Ω−1k ◦Ωk

⋄+
Ω−1
k
◦Ωk − 1

⋄ ≤ ‖Ck −Ωk ‖⋄ ≤ ǫ,
which implies that instances of CT(ǫ,δ,1 k ,Ek ) are equivalent to instances of DIǫ,δ, as required.
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4.1 QMA Protocol
To test the security of an encryption system inQMA the Verifier will need a tool to compare two quantum
states. Such a tool is provided by the swap test, introduced in [8], though here we essentially use it to test
the purity of quantum states as is done in [9].
The swap test is an efficient procedure that makes the projective measurement onto the symmetric
and antisymmetric subspaces of a bipartite space. LetW be the swap operation onH ⊗H , i.e. W (|ψ〉⊗
|φ〉) = |φ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 for all |ψ〉, |φ〉 ∈ H . The swap test performs the two-outcome projective measurement
given by the projection onto the symmetric subspace, given by (1H⊗H +W )/2, and the projection onto
the antisymmetric subspace, given by (1H⊗H −W )/2.
Given two pure states |ψ〉, |φ〉, the swap test returns the symmetric outcome with probability (1+〈ψ|φ〉2)/2. When applied to mixed states ρ,σ, the swap test can also be used to estimate the overlap,
as the result is symmetric with probability (1+ tr(ρσ))/2, as observed in [9]. Notice that this implies that
the swap test can be used to estimate the purity of a state, given two copies.
The idea behind the protocol is that if the encryption system specified by E is insecure then, regard-
less of the key chosen, it acts trivially on some subspace of the input states. In this case a proof can
consist simply of two copies of some pure state in this subspace. The Verifier runs E on both of these
states in parallel and tests that they have not been changed by performing the swap test. In the case
that the circuit is insecure, this proof state will cause the Verifier to obtain the symmetric outcome of the
swap test with probability approaching 1. Note that this protocol does not check that the input state is
unchanged, only that the output states of the two applications of E are (close to) the same pure state.
If E represents a secure encryption system, then without knowledge of the key, the output of E is
close to the completely mixed state, regardless of the input state. In this case the Verifier performs the
swap test on two highly mixed states and the result is antisymmetric with probability close to 1/2.
This protocol can be formalized as follows. A circuit implementation can be found in Figure 4.
Protocol 13. On input a circuit E : {1, . . . ,K }⊗D(H )→D(K ), an instance of DIǫ,δ, as well as a quantum
proof |φ〉 inD((H ⊗R)⊗2) (where dimR = dimH ), the Verifier performs the following protocol.
1. The Verifier generates random keys k1,k2 ∈ {1, . . . ,K }.
2. The Verifier applies (Ek1 ⊗ 1 R )⊗ (Ek2 ⊗ 1 R ) to the state |φ〉.
3. The Verifier applies the swap test to the resulting state, accepting if the outcome is symmetric.
The reference spaceR appears in this protocol, but Problem 11 places no upper bound on the size
of this space, and the value of the norm being verified may increase with the size of the spaceR . Fortu-
nately, this process stabilizes when dimR = dimH , and so we may assume that this space is of this size,
which at most doubles the number of input qubits to the protocol.
A straightforward argument based on the continuity of measurement probabilities (here given as
Lemma 1) can be used to show that this protocol is correct.
Proposition 14. For 0< ǫ < 1/8, Protocol 13 is aQMA protocol forDIǫ,δ.
Proof. If E is a ‘yes’ instance of DIǫ,δ, then there exists a state |ψ〉 ∈ H ⊗R such that for any key k ∈
{1, . . . ,K } we have
Eˆk (|ψ〉〈ψ|)− |ψ〉〈ψ|tr ≤ ǫ, where throughout this proof we use the shorthand nota-
tion Eˆk = Ek ⊗ 1 R . Let the input state be |φ〉 = |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉. Fixing notation further, let Eˆk (|ψ〉〈ψ|) = σk .
Applying Eˆk1 ⊗ Eˆk2 to |ψ〉⊗ |ψ〉 results in a stateσk1 ⊗σk2 that satisfiesσk1 ⊗σk2 − |ψ〉〈ψ| ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|tr ≤ 2ǫ, (6)
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Figure 4: The Verifier’s circuit in theQMA protocol.
which follows from the triangle inequality. Then, since the state |ψ〉〈ψ| ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ| is symmetric and we
can view the swap test can be viewed as a projective measurement, Lemma 1 shows that the swap test
returns the symmetric outcome on σk1 ⊗σk2 with probability at least 1− 2ǫ. This implies that when the
circuit E is not secure the Verifier accepts with high probability.
It remains to show that when the circuit E is a ‘no’ instance of DIǫ,δ the Verifier does not accept
any proof state with high probability. In this case we know that
∑K
k=1Ek −Ω

⋄/K ≤ ǫ. Once more, a
straightforward argument using the triangle inequality can be used to argue that the tensor product of
two copies satisfies the equation
∑K
k ,j=1Ek ⊗ E j −Ω⊗Ω

⋄/K
2 ≤ 2ǫ. This implies that regardless of the
proof state |ψ〉 the input to the swap test is within trace distance 2ǫ of the completely mixed state. On
such a state, Lemma 1 implies that the swap test returns the symmetric outcomewith probability atmost
1
2
− 1
2
tr

1K
dimK
2
+ 2ǫ =
1
2
− 1
2dimK + 2ǫ,
and so the probability the Verifier accepts is bounded above by 1/2+ 2ǫ. Thus, when ǫ < 1/8, there is a
constant gap between the acceptance probabilities in the two cases, and so DIǫ,δ ∈QMA.
Combining the previous Proposition with Theorem 12 we obtain themain result.
Theorem 15. For 0< ǫ < 1/8 and 0<δ≤ 1, the problemDIǫ,δ is QMA-complete.
5 Discussion
We have shown the QMA-hardness of a general version of the problem of testing the behaviour of a
quantum circuit. This result generalizes the proofs of hardness for many of the known circuit problems
that areQMA-hard [13, 18], aswell as allows for simple proofs of hardness for new circuit problems. As an
application of this result we have shown that the problem of detecting insecure encryption is complete
forQMA by in addition finding an efficient QMA verifier for the problem.
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An open problem related to this is to find a QMA verifier for the PURE FIXED POINT problem, or an
argument that the problem is likely to lie outside of the class. The direct approach to construct a verifier
using the swap test on (ideally) two copies of the fixed-point state, similar to the verifier in [18], does not
seem to work: the circuit that measures a qubit in the computational basis and then applies the Pauli X
gate, when applied to half of the input space, maps the symmetric state |01〉+ |10〉 to a symmetric state.
This circuit, however, does not have any pure (approximate) fixed points.
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